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02A — Services

Security for production AI systems.

LLM red teaming, agent audits, prompt injection, and RAG review. We find reproducible failures before they reach users, sensitive data, or internal tools.

02A — Services

AI Security

We test AI systems the way an attacker would: prompts, context, tools, permissions, and multi-turn flows. The output is not an abstract risk list, but reproducible PoCs and prioritized remediation.

  1. SEC.01

    LLM and agent red teaming

    Adversarial assessments of models, agents, and surfaces connected to internal tools.

  2. SEC.02

    Prompt injection testing

    Direct, indirect, and multi-turn injection coverage with reproducible suites.

  3. SEC.03

    RAG architecture review

    Access control, context segregation, retriever filtering, and data leakage from vector stores.

  4. SEC.04

    AI security training for development teams

    OWASP LLM Top 10, secure prompting, and best practices for teams integrating models into their products.

03 — Why now

Five signals that justify a red team.

Dominant attack vectors, agentic risk, data leakage, model supply chain and the real cost of an incident.

  • 01 · Attack vector2025

    Prompt injection tops the OWASP GenAI Top 10.

    LLM01 — the number-one risk in LLM applications. A crafted input — direct or via external content — can bypass the system prompt, exfiltrate data or trigger unauthorised actions. It's the first vector any serious assessment covers.

    OWASP GenAI · LLM01
  • 02 · Agentic architecture2025

    Agents with tools amplify the blast radius of any compromise.

    LLM06 “Excessive Agency” — OWASP GenAI 2025. An agent with permissions over internal APIs turns an injection into a destructive action. Mandatory mitigations: least privilege, human-in-the-loop and per-action traceability.

    OWASP GenAI · LLM06
  • 03 · Data leakage2024

    One in ten snippets employees paste into ChatGPT contains confidential data.

    Source code, financial records and personal data leaking without controls. When staff use public AI tools without private environments, DLP or access policies, everyday productivity becomes a structural leak of intellectual property.

    Cyberhaven Labs
  • 04 · Supply chain2025

    Third-party models and datasets import risk that is hard to audit.

    LLM03 “Supply Chain” — backdoored models found on public hubs. Downloaded weights, precomputed embeddings and fine-tuning corpora are attack surface. Signing, hashing and provenance review are preconditions for promoting a model to production.

    OWASP GenAI · LLM03
  • 05 · Incident cost2024

    The average data breach now costs $4.88M globally.

    IBM Cost of a Data Breach 2024 — all-time high of the series. The extra cost isn't only technical: regulator notification, reputational damage and litigation. Secure-by-design is orders of magnitude cheaper than a postmortem.

    IBM Security

04 — Use cases

What we do.

Examples of the type of projects we take on across our two service areas. If your situation looks familiar, we can probably help.

AI Security · Pre-launch

Chatbot or Agent Audit Before Launch

Problem
Companies about to deploy an AI assistant in production without knowing whether it has vulnerabilities that could leak data or be exploited.
How we do it
Full technical review: prompt injection, jailbreaks, data leaks, and guardrail gaps. Delivered in 1-2 weeks with an actionable report.

Client types

SaaS startups, clinics, customer service platforms, any company about to ship an AI system.

Similar challenge? Let's talk →

AI Security · Agentic Systems

Red Team for Agent with Access to Internal Tools

Problem
Systems where the agent can take real actions — querying databases, sending emails, modifying records — with risk of manipulation.
How we do it
Tool-based privilege escalation tests, indirect injection, and multi-turn attacks with reproducible PoCs.

Client types

SaaS with AI agents, platforms with connected tools, startups with agentic products in production.

Similar challenge? Let's talk →

AI Security · Architecture

RAG Architecture Review with Sensitive Data

Problem
RAG pipelines accessing sensitive client information without reviewed access control or context filtering.
How we do it
Architecture review and technical tests: access control, context segregation, data leakage, and vector store permissions.

Client types

Law firms, accountants, clinics, companies with RAG over sensitive internal documents.

Similar challenge? Let's talk →

AI Security · Training

AI Security Training for Development Teams

Problem
Development teams integrating LLMs into their products without knowing the specific attack vectors of these architectures.
How we do it
Hands-on course designed around the team: OWASP LLM Top 10 with live demos, secure prompting and threat modelling on the client's real stack and system.

Client types

Dev agencies, SaaS product teams, startups with engineers integrating models.

Similar challenge? Let's talk →

FAQ

What is LLM red teaming?

LLM red teaming is an adversarial evaluation process in which a security team attempts to exploit vulnerabilities in a language model or the system wrapping it: prompt injections, jailbreaks, system prompt leaks, privilege escalation via tools, and multi-turn attacks. The goal is to identify reproducible failures before a real attacker does, and to deliver prioritised remediation.

What is prompt injection in AI systems?

Prompt injection is an attack in which an attacker introduces malicious instructions into an LLM's input to alter its behaviour. In direct injection, the attacker manipulates the user prompt; in indirect injection, malicious content arrives through external sources processed by the model — websites, documents, search results. In agentic systems with access to tools, a successful injection can trigger destructive actions on internal systems.

What vulnerabilities do AI agents have?

According to OWASP GenAI Top 10 2025, the main risks in agentic systems include: prompt injection (LLM01), insecure output handling (LLM02), excessive agency (LLM06), over-reliance on the model, and sensitive information disclosure. Agents with access to internal APIs are especially vulnerable to privilege escalation and unauthorised action execution if they lack minimal permissions, human oversight, and action traceability.

How do you secure an AI chatbot or agent against attacks?

Securing a production AI system requires multiple layers: input and output validation, robust system instructions, minimal permissions for the agent over external tools, content guardrails, context segregation in RAG pipelines, full traceability of model actions, and periodic review of attack vectors. A single guardrail is not enough; security must be built into the architecture from design, not bolted on afterwards.

What is the OWASP LLM Top 10?

The OWASP LLM Top 10 is a reference framework published by OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) that lists the ten most critical security risks in large language model applications. The GenAI 2025 version covers vulnerabilities such as prompt injection, training data poisoning, system prompt leakage, excessive agency, and model supply chain vulnerabilities. It is the industry-standard reference for assessing the security posture of AI systems.

In-house training

Want your team to learn how to do this?

We run in-house technical training, not open courses. Each course is designed around the client's case: OWASP LLM Top 10, secure prompting, threat modeling and reproducible red teaming, with the scope the team asks for.

Let's talk about your AI system.

We respond within 24 – 48 business hours. We'll suggest a first call to understand your case.

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